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Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Authority'
The application of the commerce clause of the United States Constitution
to the states has been the subject of two "about face" decisions by the
United States Supreme Court in the last twenty years. Beginning in 1968,
Maryland v. Wirtz2 held that the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA)3
could constitutionally be applied to the states.4 In 1976, Wirtz was overruled
by National League of Cities v. Userys which held that the FLSA could not
constitutionally be applied to the states when it operated "to directly displace
the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional
government functions." '6 In 1985, the Supreme Court overruled National
League of Cities by holding once again that the FLSA could constitutionally
be applied to the states.7
Two major constitutional issues are posed by these cases and will be
discussed in this Note. First, whether the FLSA is an appropriate use of the
commerce power to regulate interstate commerce. Second, whether there is
a constitutional limitation on the commerce power in the tenth amendment
which precludes application of the FLSA and similar legislation to the states.
While there is no doubt under the current interpretation of the commerce
clause that the FLSA is a constitutional use of Congress' power, it is arguable
that the tenth amendment imposes a limitation on that power. The tenth
amendment issue has not been heard for the last time.
The United States Constitution gives Congress the authority "to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with indian
1. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
2. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982).
4. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 196-99 (held that FLSA amendments extending cov-
erage to state run schools and hospitals and the "enterprise concept" were consti-
tutional).
5. 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976).
6. Id. at 852. This case did not completely invalidate the FLSA. It held only
that its application to certain state functions is unconstitutional. For a discussion of
the test for determining which state functions are exempt see infra notes 98-120 and
accompanying text.
7. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). This
case was brought to determine whether operating a transit authority is an exempt
function under National League of Cities. The Court did not decide that question,
instead finding that the National League of Cities test was inappropriate. Id.
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tribes."" It is the power to regulate commerce "among the several States"
that gave rise to the FLSA. The power to regulate interstate commerce has
recently been given a very broad interpretation by the courts. That has not
always been the case.
In 1824, the Supreme Court in Gibbons v. Ogden,9 held that the com-
merce power did not stop at state boundaries, but extended into the states,' 0
and that Congress could override state law when necessary to regulate com-
merce." The Ogden court also stated that the only limitations on the com-
merce power were those prescribed in the Constitution. 2 What those limitations
are will be discussed later.
With the decision of Hammer v. Dagenhart'3 in 1918, the Supreme Court
restricted somewhat the broad scope of the commerce power. That decision
struck down the regulation of child labor as an improper regulation of in-
terstate commerce. ' 4 Congress attempted to regulate child labor by imposing
restrictions on interstate transportation of goods made by children working
in violation of the regulations. In holding the regulation of child labor in-
valid, the Court held that Congress was really attempting to regulate labor
under the pretense of regulating goods. Since the goods themselves were not
harmful, there was no valid reason for regulating the goods.' 5 The regulation
of labor conditions, on the other hand, was within the regulatory power of
the states and was not a proper subject for federal regulation.' 6 Congress
was trying to do indirectly what it could not do directly.17
8. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
9. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824).
10. Id. at 8. This case began the assertion of a broad commerce power.
Without this holding federal power over commerce would stop at the state border.
11. Id. at 14. This is an assertion of Congress' power to preempt state law
where Congress has power to regulate commerce. Congress could not effectively
regulate interstate commerce unless it could preempt conflicting state law.
12. Id. at 9 (The Court did not, however, discuss what those limitations were.).
13. 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (The Court held that Congress could not regulate
child labor standards under the commerce clause.). Child labor standards are incor-
porated in the FLSA, which was found to be constitutional in United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100 (1941). Hammer represents a period of restrictive interpetation of the
commerce clause.
14. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 276. The court recognized that it was proper to
regulate noxious goods, but in this case the goods were harmless. The regulation of
the goods was an indirect regulation of child labor. At this time Congress could not
directly regulate child labor. The Court would not allow Congress to indirectly regulate
what it could not regulate directly.
15. Id. For cases dealing with regulation of noxious goods, see Hippolite Egg
Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911); Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
16. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 273. This is similar to the tenth amendment limi-
tation argument. That is, since the power to regulate labor is not specifically given
to Congress it is reserved to the states. For a discussion of the tenth amendment
limitation, see text beginning infra at note 53.
17. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 273; see also Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). Hammer was specifically overruled by United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116-17 (1941).
[Vol. 52
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Under the restrictive interpretation of the commerce power in Hammer
v. Dagenhart, the FLSA would not be a proper use of Congress' authority.
However, that restrictive interpretation of the commerce power did not last
long. In Coronado Coal v. United Mine Workers, 8 the Court held that
Congress had authority under the commerce power to prohibit activities
which interfered with the movement of coal into interstate commerce even
though the Court found mining to be a purely local activity.19 Those activities
sufficiently affected interstate commerce so as to bring them within the pur-
view of the commerce clause. Likewise, the Court found regulation of a local
grain exchange to be within the commerce power in Board of Trade of City
of Chicago v. Olsen.20 Even though its operations were local in nature, when
combined with other grain exchanges, it had an effect on the interstate com-
merce of grain. 21
While giving Congress broad power to regulate local activity, Coronado
Coal and Olsen were still not entirely inconsistent with Hammer v. Dagen-
hart. The goods themselves, or more precisely the flow of the goods, affected
interstate commerce directly in Coronado Coal and Olsen while child labor,
dealt with in Hammer v. Dagenhart, had only an indirect effect on interstate
commerce. However, one could strongly argue that the activities prohibited
in Coronado Coal were similar to employing child labor and thus indirectly
affected commerce.
At any rate, the importance of Hammer v. Dagenhart faded quickly in
the late 1930s. In National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel,22 the Court held that Congress had the authority to regulate the labor
practices of a firm engaged in interstate commerce.23 Jones and Laughlin
Steel held that even though the plant involved produced steel locally, it was
subject to regulation because its product was sent into interstate commerce
and therefore affected commerce enough to bring it within the coriamerce
power."' The threat to interstate commerce in Jones & Laughlin Steel was
18. 268 U.S. 295 (1925).
19. Id. at 310.
20. 262 U.S. 1 (1923).
21. Id. at 37. This cumulative effect theory brought almost every activity
within the commerce power. It would be difficult to think of any activity that would
not affect interstate commerce if it were combined with all similar activities in the
United States.
22. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). Jones and Laughlin Steel Company produced steel
locally, but shipped it to other states. It also obtained raw materials from several
states. Because of this contact with other states, the steel production was subject to
regulation. This case extended the commerce power to cover employee-employer re-
lations in the plant which produced the steel. Id. at 34-43.
23. Id. at 31-32. Compare the regulation of labor practices with the regulation
of child labor standards, which was found unconstitutional in Hammer. Jones &
Laughlin Steel represents a position inconsistent with Hammer.
24. Id. at 37. This follows the test set forth in Coronado Coal for the reg-
ulation of local activities under the commerce clause. That is, if the activity affects
interstate commerce, then it is subject to regulation under the commerce clause. See
supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
1987]
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one of possible labor unrest and a strike, resulting in the reduced flow of
steel into the commerce stream. 25
United States v. Darb2 6 extended the power of the commerce clause to
"intrastate" activities which "affected" interstate commerce.27 Congress could
also regulate intrastate activities if their regulation was an appropriate means
to accomplish a legitimate regulation of interstate commerce. 28 This power
to regulate intrastate activities has been extended to allow Congress to pro-
hibit intrastate activities which restrain interstate commerce. 29 Given this broad
interpretation of the commerce clause, almost no activity would be exempt
from regulation if Congress found the requisite effect on interstate com-
merce.30
In 1938, the Fair Labor Standards Act31 was passed to regulate labor.
It was specifically designed to regulate wages and hours.12 The FLSA estab-
25. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 41-43. Compare this possible threat
to commerce with the rationale set out in the FLSA. United States Code section
202(a)-(b) states:
The Congress finds that the existence, in industries engaged in commerce or
in the production of goods for commerce, of labor conditions detrimental
to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health,
efficiency, and general well-being of workers (1) causes commerce and the
channels and instrumentalities of commerce to be used to spread and per-
petuate such labor conditions among the workers of the several states; (2)
burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; (3) constitutes
an unfair method of competition in commerce; (4) leads to labor disputes
burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of goods in com-
merce; and (5) interferes with the orderly and fair marketing of goods in
commerce. That Congress further finds that the employment of persons in
domestic service in households affects commerce.
(b) It is declared to be the policy of this chapter, through the exercise by
Congress of its power to regulate commerce among the several States and
with foreign nations, to correct and as rapidly as practicable to eliminate
the conditions above referred to in such industries without substantially
curtailing employment or earning power.
29 U.S.C. § 202 (a)-(b) (1982).
26. 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (FLSA held not to be unconstitutional exercise of the
commerce power).
27. Id. at 119-21. This merely restates the position in Coronado Coal and
Jones & Laughlin Steel. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
28. Id. at 121. For cases interpreting the necessary and proper clause see
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 415 (1819); United States v. Ferger, 250
U.S. 199 (1919).
29. Coronado Coal v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295, 310,(1925) (pro-
hibited local activities interfering with the movement of coal into interstate com-
merce); see also, Local 167, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 291
U.S. 293, 297 (1934).
30. There is language in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 415
(1819), indicating that there is no tenth amendment limitation. Id. at 421. This would
mean even state-run activities may be regulated.
31. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, ch. 676, 52 Stat.
1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982)).
32. Id. §§ 6-7.
[Vol. 52
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lished broad regulation of hours and wages similar to the legislation regu-
lating labor practices which was upheld in Jones & Laughlin Steel. 3
In order for the FLSA to be valid, Congress had to find the requisite
effect on interstate commerce. Congress' theory in passing the FLSA was
that every employee necessary for the production of goods for interstate
commerce is substantially related to the flow of interstate commerce. Since
Congress can regulate even local activities if they have a substantial effect
on interstate commerce, Congress can regulate all employees, provided they
are necessary to the production of goods which move in interstate commerce.
The Fair Labor Standards Act specifically states that substandard wages
burden the flow of goods, permit unfair competition, cause labor disputes
which obstruct commerce, and interfere with the orderly marketing of goods,
and that channels of interstate commerce are used to perpetuate these con-
ditions.3 4 The policy of the FLSA was to eliminate the conditions referred
to abqve.15 Regulation of child labor was found unconstitutional in Hammer
v. Dagenhart3 6 In upholding the FLSA as constitutional, United States v.
Darby317 specifically overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart. The Court in Darby
stated that the motives and purposes of regulation are for legislative judg-
ment."' Courts have no control over those decisions. 9 As long as the Court
finds that Congress has a rational basis for finding a regulatory scheme
necessary to protect interstate commerce, the regulation is valid.40 The Court
will not substitute its judgement for that of Congress, but it will look to see
that there is a rational basis for congressional regulation. The Court in Darby
found that there was a rational basis for the FLSA. 41
33. For a discussion concerning the coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938, see Cooper, "Extra time for Overtime" Now Law, 37 Mxc. L. REv. 28
(1938); Davisson, Coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 41 MicH. L. REv. 1060
(1943); Green, Some Heretical Remarks on the Federal Power over Commerce, 31
MINN. L. REv. 121 (1947). For a current discussion, see Wood & Wood, The Fair
Labor Standards Act: Recommendations to Improve Compliance, 1983 UTAH L. REv.
529.
34. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, ch. 676, § 2(a),
Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1982)).
35. Id. § 2(b).
36. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
37. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); see also Opp Cotton Mills
v. Administrator of the Wages & Hour Div. of the Dept. of Labor, 312 U.S. 126
(1941).
38. Darby, 312 U.S. at 115 (Court not concerned with Congress' motive;
regulation is valid if Congress has a reasonable basis for believing the regulation is
necessary to protect interstate commerce).
39. Id. (indicating these are legislative decisions of the type with which the
Court will not interfere).
40. Id. at 121. Under a rational basis test the Court will not decide the merits.
The Court will merely determine if Congress had a rational basis for its decision.
Compare this approach with a strict scrutiny test in which the Court substitutes its
judgment for that of Congress.
41. Darby, 312 U.S. at 111-12 (once rational basis found the regulation is a
valid exercise of the commerce power).
1987]
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As originally enacted, the FLSA covered those employees engaged in the
production of goods for interstate commerce. 42 Early cases held that the act
covered more than just production personnel. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling43
held the FLSA applicable to building maintenance personnel such as engi-
neers, firemen, electricians, watchmen, and porters. 4 The employees in
Kirschbaum worked for the owners of the building, not the tenant companies
which actually produced the goods.4 5 It follows that employees in these po-
sitions hired by the company actually producing the goods would be cov-
ered. 46 Thus, any employee necessary for the production of goods for
commerce is covered by the 1938 Act.47
The constitutionality of the FLSA, at least as applied to the private
sector, is well settled. 4 The FLSA was amended in 1961 to cover employees
engaged in certain enumerated enterprises rather than employees necessary
for the production of goods for interstate commerce.4 9 This amendment was
upheld in Wirtz.5 0
At the present time, no serious argument can be made that the FLSA
itself is unconstitutional. It has been upheld by nearly half a century of case
law. The major question left concerning the FLSA is whether it can be applied
to the states.
The most serious constitutional challenge faced by the FLSA is whether
it can be applied to the states or their political subdivisions. This is the
question squarely addressed in Wirtz, National League of Cities, and Garcia
v. SAMTA. 5 ' The Supreme Court has changed its mind on this issue twice
42. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, ch. 676, § 6(a),
52 Stat. 1060, 1062-63 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1982)) ("Every
employer shall pay to each of his employees who in any work week is engaged in
commerce, wages at the following rates .. .
43. 316 U.S. 517 (1942).
44. Id. at 525-26.
45. Id. at 524.
46. This is an easy case. If employees employed by the building owner who
does not produce goods for interstate commerce are covered, then employees in those
same positions employed by a manufacturer of goods for commerce must also be
covered.
47. Roland Elec. v. Walling, 326 U.S. 657 (1946).
48. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 537 (1985);
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 836 (1976); Maryland v. Wirtz,
392 U.S. 183, 189-90 (1968).
49. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, 75 Stat.
65 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1982)).
50. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183.
51. Garcia, 469 U.S. 528; National'League of Cities, 426 U.S. 833; Wirtz,
392 U.S. 183. The tenth amendment states: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states
respectively, or to the people." U.S. CoNsT. amend. X.
[Vol. 52
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in the last twenty years. There is little doubt that the issue will be raised
again.
There are no limitations on the commerce power other than those pre-
scribed in the Constitution. 2 The question then, is whether there is a con-
stitutional limitation; specifically, whether there is a tenth amendment
limitation which limits the commerce power as applied to states and cities.
The early case of McCulloch v. Maryland'3 stated that the tenth amendment
posed no limitation on federal powers.5 4 Where federal power existed that
power was complete. 5 Under this line of reasoning, it would not matter
whether the power was asserted against the private sector or the states. This
came to be the prevailing view before National League of Cities v. Usery.5 6
This view prevailed in Maryland v. Wirtz,5 1 which found the first amend-
ments to apply the FLSA to states and cities. The original Act, passed in
1938, specifically excluded the states and their political subdivisions from
coverage. 8 Through a 1961 amendment, Congress changed the basis for
coverage of the FLSA from persons necessary to the production of goods
for interstate commerce to persons employed in certain enterprises enumer-
ated in the statute.5 9 Under this scheme, courts need only to determine if the
employee is employed in one of the enumerated enterprises to find the em-
ployee covered by the FLSA, rather than determining whether he is necessary
for the production of goods for interstate commerce. This amendment did
not remove the exemption of the states. That was done by a 1966 amendment
which added hospitals, schools, and certain other institutions including those
that are public and private ° Wirtz upheld the switch to the enumerated
52. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 9 (1824).
53. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 415 (1819).
54. Id. at 420-22. Obviously this is in direct conflict with the holding in
National League of Cities.
55. Id.
56. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). See generally, Barber, National League of Cities v.
Usery: New Meaning for the Tenth Amendment?, 1976 Sup. CT. Rxv. 161. See also
Michelrnan, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YA4E L.J. 1165 (1977).
57. 392 U.S. 183 (1968). The holding at least was faithful to the prevailing
view. However, there is language leaving some doubt about the absoluteness of this
holding. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
58. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, ch. 676, § 3(d),
52 Stat. 1060, 1060 ("'Employer' includes any person acting directly or indirectly in
the interest of an employer in relation to an employee but shall not include the United
States or any State or political subdivision of a State ...").
59. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1982) now reads: "Every employer shall pay to each
of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production
of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in
the production of goods for commerce, wages at the following rates . . . ."I Id.
60. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, 80 Stat.
830, 833 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 203(r) (1982)).
1987]
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enterprise test as a reasonable regulatory scheme. 6' Wirtz also upheld appli-
cation of the FLSA to state run hospitals and schools. 62
By upholding these two amendments, Wirtz began the encroachment of
the FLSA upon the states. The FLSA was attacked in Wirtz on the grounds
that the Act would interfere with "sovereign state functions." 63 While not
specifically couched in tenth amendment terms, this is basically the tenth
amendment argument. The majority had two answers to the concern that the
act would interfere with "sovereign state functions." First, the amendments
in question did not factually interfere with the way the states performed their
sovereign functions. 4 Just what "sovereign state functions" are was not
clearly addressed in Wirtz. This first answer to the tenth amendment challenge
did not say there was no limitation on the commerce power. It only said
that, even if there is a limitation, it was not exceeded in that case.
To support its first argument, the Court pointed out that the FLSA
would have a limited effect on state run institutions because of exemptions
in the act for executive, administrative, and professional personnel.65 Medical
personnel and teachers fall under this exemption, so the employees covered
would be secretaries, janitors, watchmen, and other similar employees.6 The
Act sets minimum wage and overtime requirements only. "[It] does not
otherwise affect the way in which school and hospital duties are per-
formed."267 The Court stated that it was not factually accurate to say that
Congress was telling the states how to perform medical and educational
functions in light of the aforementioned limitations. 68
61. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 188 (1968) (Court held the "enterprise
concept" was covered by the reasoning of United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941)).
62. 392 U.S. at 196-99.
63. Id. at 193 (tenth amendment limitation argument).
64. Id. at 193-94. Whether the amendments factually interfere with the states'
sovereign functions is a question of degree. Although the amendments do not directly
tell the states what to do, they do increase costs. This, in itself, intrudes on the states'
decision making process. In this case that intrusion is minimal. Perhaps the Court
does not feel the intrusion is sufficient to warrant limiting Congress' power. On the
other hand, the Court may not feel that increased costs in themselves are an intrusion
on the states.
65. Id. at 193. Section 213(a)(1) of the United States Code provides that
certain employees are exempt. The Act exempts "any employee employed in a bona
fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity (including any employee em-
ployed in the capacity of academic administrative personnel or teacher in elementary
or secondary schools) . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (1982).
66. These employees make up a small percentage of the employees of the
institutions covered, so the increased costs of providing minimum wages for them is
comparatively small, but these are really the only employees of these institutions who
are likely to be paid less than the minimum wage in the absence of regulation.
67. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 193. Once again the effect on the states lies in the
increased cost. Increased costs undoubtedly affect state decisions.
68. Id. at 193-94.
[Vol. 52
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The Court's reasoning is only partially accurate. It is true that Congress
is not directly telling the states how to perform medical and educational
functions. However, by requiring the state to pay a minimum wage and
overtime, the Act will increase the cost of providing these functions. By
increasing the cost, Congress is indirectly influencing state decisions. The
effect is limited when compared to later extensions of the FLSA, but it does
exist.
The Court's second answer to the tenth amendment challenge was that
the federal government, through the commerce clause, could override the
states' interests. 69 "[It] is clear that the Federal Government, when acting
within a delegated power, may override countervailing state interests whether
these be described as 'governmental' or 'proprietary' in character. ' 70 The
Court relied on United States v. California which stated that there is no
limitation on the power to regulate commerce with respect to traditional
government functions. 71 "The state can no more deny the power if its exercise
has been authorized by Congress than an individual." 7 2
By its second argument, the Court held that there is no tenth amendment
limitation on the commerce power. Wirtz followed the reasoning of most
previous decisions on the tenth amendment limitation.73 "The Tenth Amend-
ment came to have no restrictive significance. It was considered a mere
expression of sentiment whose time had passed with the growth of national
power to meet national needs."17 4
It should be noted that the amendment upheld in Wirtz did not extend
coverage of the FLSA as far as the amendment struck down later.7 5 The
major impact on the states under the FLSA is increased cost of operation
because the FLSA may require the state to pay its employees higher wages.
The amendment upheld in Wirtz applied the FLSA to very few state em-
ployees, and therefore, imposed only a small financial burden when compared
to later amendments. Maryland v. Wirtz held that the tenth amendment poses
no limitation on the commerce power, however, there is language to the
effect that the Court has the power to prevent the destruction of state sov-
ereignty.76 While it is dictum, the statement leaves room to argue that there
69. Id. at 195-96 (Court stated that "federal power over commerce is 'superior
to that of the States to provide for the welfare or necessities of their inhabitants')
(quoting Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. United States, 266 U.S. 405, 426 (1925)).
70. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 195.
71. United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 185 (1936) (recognizing use of
such a test in tax area but not in the commerce clause area).
72. Id. at 185.
73. See Barber, supra note 56.
74. Id. at 162.
75. The amendments at issue in Wirtz extended coverage to the states only
in the areas of schools and hospitals. Later amendments extended coverage to all
state activities. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
76. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 196.
19871
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is some point at which the Court could limit the commerce power. Whether
later amendments extending the FLSA would, in the mind of this Court,
reach that point is something we will never know, but the Court in National
League of Cities v. Usery 7 held that the 1974 amendment went too far.78
In 1974, Congress amended the FLSA, entirely removing the previous
state exemptions from the Act.79 Thereafter, states and their political sub-
divisions were supposed to be subject to the same rules as the private sector.
However, that was not to be the case.
The reemergence of the tenth amendment began as a footnote in Fry v.
United States.80 Fry addressed the constitutionality of applying the Economic
Stabilization Act of 1970 to state employees. 8' That statute was a temporary
effort to meet what was thought to be a national economic emergency. The
Court upheld the Act, stating that the Economic Stabilization Act was not
as "drastic an invhsion of state sovereignty" as United States v. Darby.8 2
Footnote seven of the Fry opinion stated the tenth "amendment declares the
constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that
impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal
system.''83 This was the stepping stone, albeit a small one, which led to
National League of Cities.
The effect of the 1974 amendment is to extend coverage to almost all
state employees. 84 This is a more considerable burden on the state than the
FLSA amendments approved in Wirtz. After Maryland v. Wirtz, the state
only faced increased costs of operating hospitals and schools. Many em-
ployees of these institutions were exempt from coverage. 5 After the 1974
amendments, the state faced increased costs of operating all of their agencies
because of the minimum wage and overtime pay requirements. National
League of Cities v. Usery challenged the FLSA on the ground that these
increased costs intruded on state sovereignty.8 6
77. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
78. Id. at 840 (established a tenth amendment limitation on Congress' com-
merce power).
79. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982) (1974 amendments) (extended coverage of
the FLSA to nearly all public employees).
80. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 547. Because of the temporary nature of the act, the Court felt it
was not as intrusive as the FLSA upheld in Darby. That Act also addressed a national
emergency. Id. at 548.
83. Id. at 548 n.7. This footnote was used as authority in National League
of Cities for the premise that there is a limitation on the commerce power. National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976).
84. By removing the exception of the states from the FLSA, these amendments
made the Act apply to the states in the same manner it applies to individuals.
85. See supra note 65 concerning exemptions from the FLSA.
86. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 839 (1976).
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In National League of Cities v. Usery, the Supreme Court held that the
1974 amendments were unconstitutional to the extent that they "operate to
directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas
of traditional government functions. . . ."7 This holding did not completely
overrule the 1974 amendments. The 1976 amendments are overruled only as
they apply to traditional government functions. The FLSA is still applicable
to activities of the states that are not traditional government functions. De-
termining what are "traditional government functions" is the major problem
with National League of Cities, and is discussed later in this Note in con-
nection with Garcia v. SAMTA.
National League of Cities was based on a theory of state sovereignty.
"We have repeatedly recognized that there are attributes of State sovereignty
attaching to every State government which may not be impaired by Congress,
not because Congress may lack an affirmative grant of legislative authority
to reach the matter, but because the [C]onstitution prohibits it from exercising
the authority in that manner." 88 This is the basic tenth amendment argument.
That is, while Congress may have authority to regulate a particular aspect
of commerce, it cannot exercise it with respect to the states if it intrudes on
the rights or powers reserved to the states in the Constitution. Federal power
ends where state power begins if that state power is one of the states' sov-
ereign powers. The Court went on to quote an opinion which stated that
the power to set wages to those they employ to carry out their governmental
functions was one attribute of state sovereignty. 89
The power to set wages of state employees carrying out state government
functions is an attribute of state sovereignty. The FLSA attempts to regulate
this attribute and it intrudes on state sovereignty. Therefore, if one accepts
the proposition that federal power ends where it intrudes on state sovereignty,
the FLSA is unconstitutional when it attempts to set wages for employees
who carry out state governmental functions.
This entire theory hinges on whether there is, in fact, a judicial limitation
on Congress' power. As pointed out earlier, there was language in Wirtz to
the effect that the courts had power to prevent destruction of the states as
political entities.9 0 This language was pointed out in National League of Cities
as authority that such a limitation does exist. 91 The Court also used footnote
seven from the opinion in Fry v. United States as authority for a tenth
87. Id. at 852.
88. Id. at 845. This is a key link in the Court's reasoning. There must be
state functions which Congress cannot reach with the commerce power before any
of this is relevant. The opposing view is that there is no affirmative limit on Congress'
power to regulate state activities.
89. Id. (the Court quoted Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911)).
90. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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amendment limitation. The Court analyzed the tenth amendment limitation
with other recognized limitations on commerce power regulations. "Consti-
tutional enactments ... may nonetheless be invalid because found to offend
against the right to trial by jury92 . . .or the Due Process Clause of the fifth
amendment." 93 The fifth and sixth amendments, however, are specifically
enumerated rights and are rights of the people, not rights of the states. 94 The
Court's analogy is not persuasive.
The Court also used the analogy of tax law where some intergovern-
mental immunity is recognized. 95 However, the Court recognized early that
the power to tax is the power to destroy. 96 That is the basis for tax immunity.
Regulating the states is not as intrusive as taxing them. The Court in United
States v. California recognized that it looks to traditional state activities to
mark the boundary for taxation, but stated that there was no such limitation
on the commerce power.Y In all fairness to the Court's position in National
League of Cities, however, it must be recognized that regulations like the
FLSA which require the states to expend additional funds have an effect on
the states very similar to taxation. The difference is that taxation is direct
while regulation indirectly increases state expenditures. One could argue that
regulations which cause increased expenditures by the state should be treated
in the same manner as taxation because of their similar effects.
In any event, if there is a tenth amendment limitation which precludes
regulation of some state activities, the issue then becomes determining which
activities are exempt.
The tenth amendment limitation, even if it exists, does not prevent all
coverage of the state by the FLSA. Determing which state activities are
exempt is a problem. A four part test arose out of National League of Cities
to determine which activities are exempt.
The first prong of the test is that the statute in question must regulate
the states as states.9" This means that the statute regulates the state as it
exists in the federal system as opposed to the people of the state.Y If the
92. Id.
93. Id. The Court's argument based upon the fifth and sixth amendments is
not very convincing, however, because these are rights of individuals, not of the
states. The argument is useful only by analogy.
94. See supra note 93.
95. 426 U.S. at 843.
96. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 415, 436 (1819). Taxing a
state directly removes revenue from the state. Regulating indirectly does so. The state
can offset the effect of regulation to some extent, but it cannot do the same with
taxation.
97. United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 185 (1936) (held the Safety
Appliance Act applicable to state run railroads.)
98. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 854 (1976).
99. See Michelman, supra note 56.
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statute regulates the people of the state it is not invalid under this prong of
the test, even if the statute conflicts with state law. 10
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, Inc.10 1
dealt with the first prong of the test. Hodel held the Surface Mining Act'0 2
constitutional because it did not regulate the states as states. The Surface
Mining Act provided that if the state did not adopt state legislation meeting
certain requirements, the federal government would step in and regulate land
reclamation. The states were not forced to adopt any regulation. 03 If Con-
gress had attempted to force adoption of state regulation then it would have
been regulating the states as states.
The second prong of the test is that the statute must address an attribute
of state sovereignty. '0 The state sovereignty argument is based on early cases,
certain Federalist papers, and the United States Constitution. The argument
starts with the theory that the powers delegated to the federal government
are "few and defined.'" t° 5 The other powers are retained by the states, in-
cluding those concerning the affairs and welfare of their citizens. 106 The state
governments would generally be considered more important than the federal
government. 107
The states retain sovereignty over all matters not given to the federal
government by the Constitution.10 s Under the tenth amendment, Congress
may not exercise its power "in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity
or their ability to function effectively in a federal system."' 1 9 If one of the
sovereign powers retained by the states is restricted by a federal regulation
in a manner that interferes with the independent existence of the states, the
federal regulation is invalid.110
The third prong of the test is the regulation must directly impair the
states' ability to structure operations "in areas of traditional government
100. See supra notes 8-47 and accompanying text.
101. 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (good discussion of the National League of Cities
test).
102. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982).
103. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288.
104. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845; see supra note 88 and ac-
companying text.
105. 1 TE FEDERALIST, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED




108. These are the powers of the states that Congress supposedly cannot impair.
Just exactly what these powers are remains an open question.
109. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 843 (1976) (quoting Fry v. United
States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)). It should be noted that this language is found
in footnote seven in Fry. That does not enhance its value as authority for its prop-
osition.
110. See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852.
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functions.""' This is the controversial requirement. What are traditional
government functions?
A related issue is how the FLSA impairs the states' ability to structure
its operations. Justice Douglass, in his dissent in Wirtz, pointed out that the
FLSA would force the states and cities to raise taxes, curtail hospital and
school services, curtail other services, or refrain from entering new activities
to meet changing conditions because of the new financial burdens imposed
by the FLSA." 2
The FLSA required the state to pay a minimum wage and overtime pay.
This increases the cost of operating state institutions. Since the state has a
limited budget, it must restructure its operations to meet these new costs.
The 1976 amendment gave rise to much higher costs than those upheld in
Wirtz, and therefore required the state to restructure its operations even
more. The Court discussed the effect the FLSA had on several states and
municipalities."' These effects included increased costs of operation and re-
duced training of highway patrol officers because of the increased costs that
would otherwise be required.14 The Court, in National League of Cities,
held that the increased costs displaced state policies in structuring and deliv-
ering traditional governmental services." 5
This prong was the main issue in the cases following National League
of Cities."6 These cases came up with no clearly defined line between tra-
ditional government functions and non-exempt functions." 7 This prong of
the test was attacked as being unworkable in Garcia v. SAMTA and was
one of the reasons for overruling National League of Cities.1 8 This prong
will be discussed further in conjunction with Garcia v. SAATA.
111. Id. at 852.
112. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 203 (1968). Those who support a tenth
amendment limitation must believe these increased costs are a sufficient intrusion on
the states before such a limitation may be invoked.
113. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 846-47.
114. Id. By this discussion the Court is trying to show how the FLSA affects
state decision making. Take the case of the California Highway Patrol officers who
were receiving less training because the state could not afford to pay the overtime
required by the FLSA. The state then decided to reduce the quality of its patrolmen
rather than absorb the increased costs.
115. Id. at 849. The Court's holding, in theory at least, makes more sense than
the Court's first answer to tenth amendment concerns in Wirtz. See supra note 64.
However, Wirtz does not base its holding entirely on this argument. See supra note
69.
116. For a summary of some of these, cases see Garcia, 469 U.S. at 538-39.
117. Id. The Court looked at the cases it summarized and could find no com-
mon characteristics differentiating traditional government functions from non-exempt
functions.
118. Id. at 538-47.
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The last prong of the test is that the federal interest must not be such
that it justifies state submission.'1 9 This is a balancing test which would allow
regulation if the federal interest was paramount. This fourth prong of the
test could arise in a variety of situations. One such situation would be leg-
islation similar to the Economic Recovery Act upheld in Fry v. United States,
in which Congress responded to a national emergency. Another situation in
which the Court recognized a paramount federal interest is the regulation of
railroads. 20
After National League of Cities, any state activity which met the four
prong test was exempt from FLSA coverage, but the Court struggled with
the third prong of the test trying to determine which functions were "tra-
ditional government functions." 1 2' Garcia v. SAMTA was litigated to deter-
mine whether municipal ownership of a mass transit system was a traditional
government function.
The City of San Antonio regulated public transportation until 1959 when
it bought the San Antonio Transit Company and created the San Antonio
Transit System.'2 In 1978, the facilities and equipment were transferred to
a public mass transit authority known as the San Antonio Mass Transit
Authority (SAMTA). 1n The suit was brought to enforce the minimum wage
and overtime requirements of the FLSA against SAMTA. The federal district
court decided that such ownership fell within the concept of traditional gov-
ernment function and was thus exempt from FLSA coverage.2 4 In previous
decisions, other courts had decided that ownership of a mass transit system
was not a traditional government function.25
On consideration of the case, the Supreme Court sidestepped the issue
of whether operation of SAMTA was a traditional government function and
119. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852-55 (1976). This
prong of the test seems to be drawn from Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion.
Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
120. United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678, 687 (1982)
(Court discussed the National League of Cities test but found it inapplicable because
the federal government has a greater interest in regulating railroads than the states).
121. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
122. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 531. There is no doubt that if the transit company
had remained private it would now be covered by the FLSA.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 533-35.
125. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth. v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp 445 (W.D.
Tex. 1983), reh'g denied, 471 U.S. 1049 (1985). Three Federal courts of appeals and
one state appellate court have reached the opposite conclusion on this same issue.
See, Dove v. Chattanooga Area Regional Transp. Auth., 701 F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1983);
Alewine v. City Council, 699 F.2d 1060 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. City
of Macon v. Joiner, 470 U.S. 1027 (1985); Kramer v. New Castle Area Transit Auth.,
677 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1146 (1983); Francis v. City of
Tallahassee, 424 So. 2d 61 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
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rejected the traditional government function test as "unsound in principle
and unworkable in practice." 2 6 The Supreme Court overruled National Lea-
gue of Cities and its test for state immunity from regulation under the com-
merce clause. 27 This is the second of the "about face" decisions.
The Court gave several reasons why the traditional government function
test was inappropriate. The first is difficulty of application.'2 National Lea-
gue of Cities set forth examples of immune functions and those which are
not immune, but did not explain how they were identifiedY2 Despite many
adjectives, identifying immune state functions remains difficult. 30 Various
adjectives have been used including traditional, essential, strictly govern-
mental, and historically governmental.'
In summarizing cases following National League of Cities, the Court
listed as functions which are exempt from regulation: regulating ambulance
services, licensing automobile drivers, operating a municipal airport, per-
forming solid waste disposal, and operating a highway authority.3 2 Listed
as non-exempt functions were: issuance of industrial development bonds,
regulation of intrastate natural gas sales, regulation of traffic on public roads,
regulation of air transportation, operation of a telephone system, leasing and
sale of natural gas, operation of a mentaf health facility, and provision of
domestic services for the aged and handicapped.'
The Court stated that it found it difficult to identify an organizing
principle to differentiate the exempt and non-exempt functions listed above.3 4
"Thus far, this Court itself has made little headway in defining the scope
of the governmental functions deemed protected under National League of
Cities." 35
The Court pointed to its experience in determining state immunity from
federal taxation as further evidence that such a standard is difficult to ap-
126. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546-47.
127. Id. at 531 (after deciding to overrule National League of Cities, there was
no reason for the Court to address the issue brought before them).
128. Id. at 538-40.
129. Id. at 539 (operation of railroads not exempt); see United States v. Cal-
ifornia, 297 U.S. 175 (1936). Fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public
health, and parks and recreation were also cited as exempt functions. National League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976).
130. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth. v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. 445 (W.D.
Tex. 1983), reh'g denied, 471 U.S. 1049 (1985).
131. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 540. While each of these adjectives has slightly dif-
ferent meanings they are all used for the same purpose in this context, to mark the
boundary of federal power under the Constitution.
132. Id. at 538-39.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 539 (difficulty in finding an organizing principal used by the Court
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ply. 3 6 The governmental versus proprietary test used in the tax area was
unstable. 13 7 The Court illustrated the test's instability with two opinions: one
holding that providing a municipal water supply was immune from taxation
and the other holding that it was not immune.'38 Because of the instability
and uncertainty of the governmental versus proprietary test, it was abandoned
in New York v. United States.3 9
The Court also stated that the historical test for traditional government
functions was too restrictive. 140 An historical test bases immunity on whether
a state historically engaged in a particular activity. Such a test prevents courts
from accomodating changing circumstances.' 4' No new activities of the state
could be immune, no matter how important that activity may be, because
the activity was not historically engaged in by the state. The Court also
pointed out that the uniquely governmental function test was rejected in the
area of government tort liability because it was unmanageable. 142 The nec-
essary government function test would also restrict the choices of the states
and would require the courts to determine the economic necessity of state
activities. 143 State choices would be restricted because activities which the
state feels are appropriate for them to engage in may not be "necessary"
and therefore not exempt from regulation. The necessity test would be one
of a strict necessity as opposed to one comparable to the broad test under
the necessary and proper clause.44 Courts would then have to determine if
a particular state activity is strictly necessary to the operation of state gov-
ernment.
The Court stated "[a]ny rule of state immunity that looks to the 'tra-
ditional,' or 'integral,' or 'necessary' nature of governmental functions inev-
itably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which
136. Id. at 540. The Court did not cite to any cases specifically stating that
the tax area test was difficult to apply, but merely stated the Court never developed
a "consistent formulation" of the test for immunity in the tax area. Id.
137. Id. at 541-42. When the state enters the marketplace seeking customers it
is acting in its proprietary capacity and may be taxed. See Ohio v. Helvering, 292
U.S. 360 (1934).
138. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 542; see Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 172(1911). Cf., Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 352, 370-73 (1937).
139. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
140. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 543-44.
141. Id. The Court is recognizing the fact that, in a modern society, govern-
ments may need to expand their operations to meet the needs of their citizens. The
Court apparently does not want to restrict any necessary or desireable expansion of
a state's operations.
142. Id. at 545. The inference is that the test would be unmanageable in the
commerce power context also.
143. Id. If Courts are to administer this type of test, they must necessarily
determine which activities they feel are necessary for the states to survive as separate
entities.
144. See supra note 28 for case interpreting the necessary and proper clause.
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state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes." 145 These are decisions best
made by the people and their elected representatives, not the courts.'4 Any
such test, the Court said, would not be faithful to the role of federalism in
a democratic society.147
Garcia held that any limit on Congress' authority under the commerce
clause is built into the political process.' 4 The Court rejected any rule of
state immunity based on integral or traditional governmental functions .
49
The Court stated that the role of the state in electing federal legislators
and executives is a built-in procedural safeguard against abuse of power under
the commerce clause.'1 Where the federal government has regulated state
activity, it has also provided financial support for those activities.' Specif-
ically, the Court pointed out that SAMTA recieved $12 million from the
federal government in its first two years alone.' 5 2 This, says the Court, is
proof that the procedural safeguards are working. 5 1 Congress imposed reg-
ulations on the states which increased the cost of operating state activities,
but Congress also provided financial support to help offset these increased
costs. At least in the mind of the Court, this shows that the states have
enough influence over Congress to keep Congress from increasing the states'
costs of operation without compensation from the federal government to
offset costs. The states' influence over Congress is derived from the proce-
dural safeguard mentioned by the Court.
The role of the states in selecting federal officials is not what it was at
the time the Constitution was adopted. Senators were once elected by state
legislatures, now senators are elected by the people. The influence of the
states is not as great as it was when the state legislature elected senators, but
apparently the Court feels the states still have enough influence to protect
their own interests.
No one can doubt the strong influence states and cities have over Con-
gress. The Court's position on the states' ability sufficiently to limit Congress'
power to protect the states' sovereign status is certainly defensible. In modem
politics, the states and cities probably exert most of their influence over
Congress through lobbying. They also have some influence through the voting
145. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546.
146. Id. Either the courts make the decisions or the legislature makes the
decisions. The Court feels that the legislature is in a better position to make decisions
about which state policies should be favored.
147. Id. Presumably, in a democratic society, the people through their elected
representatives are to make the decisions which govern their lives, not the courts.
148. Id. at 556; see also Wickern v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
149. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546.
150. Id. at 552.
151. Id. at 552-53.
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process. Voters who reside in a state or municipality should vote for con-
gressmen who will protect that state or municipality's interests. This is the
whole basis of a democratic society. If certain state activities should be
exempted from FLSA coverage it would seem that the legislative process is
the proper place to make exceptions.
Very little has changed in the years between National League of Cities
and Garcia which would explain the holding in Garcia. Justice O'Connor is
the only new member of the Court since National League of Cities and she
voted to sustain that decision. All of the Justices voting to overrule National
League of Cities voted to sustain its principles in later cases.'" 4
Why did the Court change its mind? The only reason that can be drawn
from Garcia itself is that Justice Stevens and Justice Blackmun changed their
minds and decided the National League of Cities test was unworkable. Justice
Blackmun, it should be noted, qualified his concurrence in National League
of Cities. His reason was to make it clear that his concurrence was based
on his belief that the National League of Cities test allowed federal regulation
if the national interest outweighed state interests. 155 However, that sheds little
light on his position in Garcia. National League of Cities allowed federal
regulation of the states, but only if an important federal interest needed to
be protected. Garcia allows federal regulation of the states. The two holdings
are far apart.
The Constitution is necessarily vague. It was written to stand the test
of time and change. Both National League of Cities and Garcia are plausable
interpetations, but there are problems with both interpetations. Under a
National League of Cities test, courts will have to decide which state activities
are so important that they should not be regulated. Courts will also have to
decide which state activities are "traditional," and thus exempt from regu-
lation. This is a function best left to the legislature. Such a test is difficult
for the courts to apply and results in instability in interpetation. Legislative
action would at least have the potential to be more stable.
The Garcia test also has problems. Congress is, to some extent, intruding
on the decision making process of the states. The FLSA increases the states'
cost of operating. This is offset to some extent by appropriations of federal
funds, but federal appropriations may not completely offset the increased
costs. In light of the current move toward cutting the federal budget, it is ques-
tionable whether the states can continue to exercise enough influence to retain
these federal funds. It seems that the Garcia Court overlooked this possibility.
Perhaps the Court believed that states would continue to have enough influ-
ence. One must not overlook the possibility that the states could get Congress
to amend the FLSA so as to remove certain activities from its coverage. This
154. Id. at 558-59 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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is the core of the built-in political limitation on the commerce power.
Congress is intruding on state decisions in other ways as well. By im-
posing a minimum wage, Congress is limiting the ability of the state to hire
less skilled workers who might not be able to find work in the private sector
because they are not productive enough to be worth the minimum wage.
Minimum wages also restrict the desirability of hiring teenagers during the
summer.
It remains to be seen how the political process will work as a limitation
on the commerce power. If history is any indication, the political process
will work. It should be remembered that, in a historical context, National
League of Cities is a more aberrational holding than Garcia. Writers after
National League of Cities pointed out that it would be difficult to find a
firm constitutional basis for that holding. 156
The holding of Garcia, however, is not yet set in concrete. It was a five
to four decision. Two of the majority Justices were on the other side of the
fence in National League of Cities. It is very likely that they could change
their minds again if Garcia does not work. Any personnel change on the
court would put this holding in jeopardy. In light of the Court's argument
that congressional appropriations to the states to offset increased costs is
proof that the procedural safeguards are working, perhaps the most impor-
tant factor in whether Garcia stands is the fate of federal balanced budget
proposals. If federal funding to the states is cut, the Court may become
disillusioned with the political safeguard theory. The constitutional issue is
not clear cut. The present decision seems to be between two theories, each
of which has its problems. Only time will tell if the reasoning of Garcia is
sound.
GERALD D. WEINER
156. Barber, supra note 56, at 164.
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